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BRINGING THE CAMEL INTO THE TENT:  STATE AND 
FEDERAL POWER OVER ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
“The federal camel has a tendency to occupy permanently any state tent. 
That may be a wise course; but if so, Congress should make the 
decision.”1 
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON2 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 72 
A. FERC’s Historical Authority  
 for Regulating Transmission.......................................... 73 
 B. Energy Policy Act of 1992 ............................................. 75 
 C. Order 888....................................................................... 75 
 D. Order 2000 .................................................................... 77 
 II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ....................................................... 77 
A. The Constitutional Basis for  
 Federal Regulation of Transmission ............................. 78 
 B. Judicial Challenges to FERC’s Power .......................... 79 
 C. Jurisdiction Over Bundled and  
  Unbundled Transmission ............................................... 80 
D. New York v. FERC: The Struggle to  
 Define Interstate Transmission...................................... 81 
E. New York v. FERC: The Controversy  
 Over Bundled Retail Transmission ................................ 82 
F. How Should the Supreme Court  
 Decide the Issue in New York v. FERC? ....................... 83 
 III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................... 85 
 A. Efficiency ....................................................................... 86 
1. Permitting FERC to Maintain  
 Jurisdiction Over Unbundled Retail  
 Transmission........................................................... 87 
 
                                                                
1Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 476 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
2B.A. 1993, University of Washington; M.P. Aff. 1998, LBJ School of Public Affairs, The 
University of Texas; J.D. candidate 2002, The University of Texas School of Law.  I would 
like to thank Professor Jim Rossi for his guidance and assistance in producing this article.  Of 
course, the opinions expressed in this article—and any mistaken suppositions involved—are 
mine alone.  I would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Cleveland State Law Review 
for their diligent and thoughtful editing.  Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Thom, for 
his constant love and encouragement. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
72 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:71 
2. Extending FERC’s Authority to  
 Cover Bundled Retail Transmission....................... 88 
3. Increasing the Number of Utilities  
 Subject to FERC’s Jurisdiction .............................. 89 
 4. Regional Transmission Organizations.................... 90 
 5. Transmission Siting ................................................ 92 
 B. Innovation ...................................................................... 93 
 C. Predictability and Consistency ...................................... 94 
 1. Refunctionalization................................................. 94 
 2. Municipalization..................................................... 97 
 D. Fairness ......................................................................... 98 
 E. Federalism ..................................................................... 99 
 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................ 100 
 V. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 103 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Jurisdiction over electricity transmission has emerged as one of the critical issues 
in today’s energy policy.  As the electricity market opens to competition, generating 
companies want to ensure access to transmission lines at a reasonable price.  Utilities 
owning transmission assets want to ensure a continuation of profits.  For all utilities, 
regulatory action is a primary determinant of available prices and profits.  
Traditionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has asserted 
jurisdiction over energy transmitted through interstate commerce, while state public 
service commissions have claimed jurisdiction over energy distributed to local 
consumers.  
Restructuring has added a degree of uncertainty, however; as wholesale 
competition increases and as states “unbundle” the transmission of electricity from 
generation and distribution, questions arise as to whether such transactions should be 
regulated at the state or federal level.  This jurisdictional uncertainty has contributed 
to reduced investment in new transmission facilities.  Most experts agree that new 
transmission is needed to remedy the significant limitations in the current grid. 
According to one report, while “[w]ell-known bottlenecks on the grid are scattered 
around the East and Midwest,”3 North American Reliability Council research 
“show[s] that only 6,588 miles of new transmission at 230-kv and above are planned 
in all of  North America in the next 10 years.”4  This transmission-construction 
shortage is of fairly recent vintage.  Before competition in the electric industry swept 
the United States in the nineties, “the construction of powerplants went hand-in-hand 
with construction of transmission lines and everybody knew the role of the 
generation with the transmission components.”5  Now, with “thousands of megawatts 
                                                                
3Thomas F. Armistead, Delivering a Shock to the System, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, 
July 12, 1999, available at http://www.enr.com/new/c0712.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
4Id. 
5Id. 
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of non-utility generation capacity coming on line in 2001 and 2002,” the report says 
it is hard to know “where the stresses will be” in the transmission grid.6  It is clear, 
however, that the stresses in the system will continue to grow: total transactions in 
one typical transmission control area have grown from 3,500 transactions in 1996 to 
approximately 45,000 transactions in 1999.7 
There are currently two very distinct discussions taking place about the scope of 
federal jurisdiction over transmission.  The first debate, taking place in the courts, 
seeks to determine the limits of FERC’s jurisdiction over transmission under current 
statutes.  The second debate, centered in Congress, seeks to answer the question of 
what FERC’s jurisdiction over transmission should be and, more generally, what 
type of federal regulation over transmission would most benefit the country. 
This paper provides a framework for understanding the current controversy 
regarding jurisdiction over the power grid, and provides policy-oriented solutions to 
ensure an adequate, low-cost transmission supply.  The main thesis of this paper—
drawn from the introductory quote by Justice Douglas—is that sound transmission 
policy requires greater federal power, and that Congress is better equipped than the 
courts to enact such policy.  To this end, Part I of the paper offers an historical 
outline of the problem and analyzes the statutes and regulations that form the 
backbone of both the federal and state jurisdictional claims.  Part II looks at legal 
considerations regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction.  It analyzes the 
constitutional basis for Congressional power, examines recent litigation challenging 
the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction, and concludes that the states have a stronger 
position than FERC with regard to the proper interpretation of the Federal Power 
Act.  Assuming that the Supreme Court is not likely to award FERC its desired 
jurisdiction, Part III of the paper looks at the possibility of a Congressional solution.  
It examines transmission issues in light of various policy goals, including efficiency, 
innovation, predictability, fairness, and concepts of federalism.  Finally, Part IV 
offers recommendations for future legislation that can facilitate these policy goals 
while remaining politically acceptable to all parties.  
A.  FERC’s Historical Authority for Regulating Transmission 
The FERC draws its jurisdictional power from the Federal Power Act of 1935, 
which specified that FERC’s predecessor agency, the Federal Power Commission, 
could regulate “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of 
such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”8  The Act went on to say, 
however, that such federal jurisdiction “extends only to those matters which are not 
subject  to regulation  by the  States.”9  Prior  to the passage of the FPA, the Supreme 
                                                                
6Id. 
7Assuring Reliability of Transmission Grids in Increasingly Competitive Electricity 
Market: Hearing Before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (statement of David R. Nevius, Vice President, North American Electric Reliability 
Council), available at ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/docs/testimony/Senate_Testimony 
_July_15 _1999.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
816 U.S.C. § 824 (a) (2001). 
9Id. 
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Court had held that states were forbidden under the Dormant Commerce Clause from 
regulating interstate sales of electricity,10 making such sales the natural base for the 
FPC’s (and later for FERC’s) jurisdiction.  What was not so clear was how to define 
interstate transmission in a grid connected across among many states.  The statute 
required that “electric energy shall be held to be transmitted in interstate commerce if 
transmitted from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof.”11 
Courts took an expansive view of FERC’s authority, and interpreted the 
definition of “interstate commerce” more broadly than might be apparent from a 
plain reading of the statute. Even if a utility sold power to another utility in the same 
state, the Supreme Court was willing to classify the sale as a transaction in interstate 
commerce.12  According to the Court, the question was not whether the federal 
agency could regulate only what the states were forbidden constitutionally from 
regulating, but rather whether Congress had intended to delegate such regulatory 
power to the states.13 Consequently, the Court held that “all sales of electric energy at 
wholesale” could be subject to the FPC’s jurisdiction.14  The Court upheld this 
determination in Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light,15 which 
upheld federal jurisdiction even when FP&L’s transmission lines were only 
connected to other Florida utilities, since the utilities were connected to a larger, 
interconnected grid, and the electricity in the grid would be commingled with 
electricity sold in interstate commerce.16  According to one author, it was the 
“commingling of electricity flowing in interstate commerce [that] resulted in FP&L’s 
engagement in interstate transmission and wholesales subject to the Commission's 
broad jurisdiction, notwithstanding FP&L’s pleas about its facilities’ intrastate 
locations, power flows, and the markets for its sales.”17  
Regulation over generation and distribution did not cause the same controversy.  
To the extent that states had the power to regulate the industry, this power generally 
came from Congressional delegation.18  The FPA gave this authority exclusively to 
                                                                
10See Public Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam and Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
1116 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2001). 
12See Federal Power Comm’n v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210 
(1964) (holding that the sale of energy from one California utility to another was a sale in 
interstate commerce). 
13See id. at 220 (“[T]he legislative history of Part II of the Power Act demonstrates that 
Congress believed that Attleboro and the related cases compelled it to forego its assumption as 
to state regulation and displace it with comprehensive federal regulation.”). 
14Id. at 210. 
15404 U.S. 453 (1972). 
16Id.  
17William H. Penniman & Paul B. Turner, A Jurisdictional Clash Over Electricity 
Transmission: Northern States Power v. FERC, 20 ENERGY L.J. 205, 216 (1999).   
18Charles H. Koch Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the 
Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 589 (2000) (“Traditionally, the 
electric utility industry and, specifically, the transmission segment of the industry have been 
considered interstate commerce, and as a consequence, the state’s regulatory authority over the 
industry derives purely from congressional delegation.”). 
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the states, noting that the FPC “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for 
the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only 
for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce.”19  As stated, 
however, the “transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce” proved to be 
an exceedingly narrow category; courts were willing to view almost all transmission 
as occurring in interstate commerce. 
B.  Energy Policy Act of 199220 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 sought to introduce wholesale competition in the 
electric industry; it ordered that FERC require utilities to deliver electricity for resale 
at “reasonable, nondiscriminatory, cost-based rates.”21  While the EPAct permitted 
FERC to order wholesale wheeling, it expressly forbade the FERC from mandating 
retail wheeling; it stated that FERC cannot require transmission “directly to an 
ultimate customer.”22  According to one author, the EPAct “largely contemplated 
discrete, transactional requests for transmission access.”23  Taking advantage of its 
power to mandate wholesale wheeling, FERC decided to “advance transmission 
access nationwide significantly” by issuing Order 888.24 
C.  Order 888 
In 1996, the FERC issued Order 888.25  The goal of Order 888 was to encourage 
wholesale competition by preventing transmission-owning entrenched utilities from 
charging higher prices for new generators to wheel power over their lines.26  Based 
on the power given to FERC by the EPAct, FERC required utilities to open their 
transmission lines to competing electricity generators at the same price as the utility 
would  charge  its  own affiliate.  Order 888 also required  what is termed “functional 
                                                                
1916 U.S.C. § 824 (b)(1) (2001). 
20Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
21Koch, supra note 18, at 577 n. 40. 
2216 U.S.C. § 824k(h)(1) (2001). 
23Virginia B. Rutledge, Restructuring Of The Electric Utilities Industry: An Overview For 
Government Finance Officials, GOV’T FIN. REV., Feb. 1997, at 19, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, ALLNEWS file. 
24Id.  
25See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996); F.E.R.C. Statutes and 
Regulations ¶ 31,036 (1996); order on rehearing, Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 
(1997); F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations ¶ 31,048, ¶ 31,780-83 (1997). 
26Ben Lanka, New York v. FERC, On The Docket—Medill School of Journalism, 
available at http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
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unbundling”27—the separation of a utility’s transmission function from its 
“wholesale electricity merchant function.”28  Specifically, Order 888 required that 
utilities: 
1) [F]ile open-access, nondiscriminatory tariffs that contain minimum terms 
and conditions of nondiscriminatory service prescribed by FERC through its 
pro forma tariff;  
2) [T]ake transmission service for their own, new wholesale sales and 
purchases of electric energy under the same terms and conditions as they 
offer that service to others;  
3) [D]evelop and maintain a same-time information system that will give 
potential and existing transmission users the same access to transmission 
information that the utility enjoys (called the “Open Access Same-Time 
Information System” or OASIS); and  
4) [S]tate separate rates for wholesale generation, transmission and ancillary 
services.29 
Order 888 contains a seven-factor test for determining which facilities should be 
considered transmission assets (and therefore subject to the open-access 
requirements) and which facilities should be considered distribution, and therefore 
not subject to the requirements.  The seven factors are: 
1) Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail 
customers.  
2) Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character.  
3) Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever, flows out.  
4) When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or 
transported on to some other market.  
5) Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively 
restricted geographical area.  
6) Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure 
flows into the local distribution system.  
7) Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage.30 
One of the most controversial points of Order 888 is that it assumes that the 
FERC has jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission; the implications of this 
assumption are discussed further in Subpart II(C). 
                                                                
27See Hearing Before the Virginia General Assembly Joint Subcommittee, 1998 Leg. (Va. 
1998) (statement of Shelton Cannon, Director, Office of Electric Power Regulation, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission), available at http://dls.state.va.us/groups/sjr91/7998/79 
FERC.HTM (last visited Oct. 25, 2001) (stating that the key components of functional 
unbundling are “1. Quot[ing] separate rates for wholesale generation and transmission service; 
2. Tak[ing] wholesale (and unbundled retail) transmission service under its own transmission 
tariff; [and] 3. Provid[ing] and rely[ing] upon same time access to transmission information—
through the OASIS”).  
28State Commissions Ask Supreme Court to Review FERC Order 888, UTIL. INDUSTRY 
LITIG. REP., Dec. 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS file. 
29Id. 
30Order No. 888, Statutes and Regulations F.E.R.C. ¶ 31,780-83 (1997); Order No. 888-A, 
Statutes and Regulations F.E.R.C. ¶ 30,339-41. 
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D.  Order 2000 
In Order 2000, FERC issued its requirements for Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs).  RTOs have been described as structures “designed to 
consolidate control and delivery of electricity across various types of transmission 
systems within a particular region.”31  FERC has stated that it expects several 
benefits to accrue from RTOs, including “increased efficiency through regional 
transmission pricing and the elimination of rate pancaking; improved congestion 
management; more accurate estimates of [available transmission capacity] . . .  
reduced transaction costs; facilitation of . . . state retail access programs; 
[environmental benefits] in states with retail access programs; improved grid 
reliability; and fewer opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices.”32  
According to FERC, this long list of benefits will culminate in one important 
outcome: “All of these improvements to the efficiencies in the transmission grid will 
help improve power market performance, which will ultimately result in lower prices 
to the Nation's electricity consumers.”33 
Specifically, Order 2000 required “all public utilities. . . that own, operate or 
control interstate transmission facilities” to “file with the Commission . . . a proposal 
for an RTO . . . or, alternatively, a description of efforts to participate in an RTO, any 
existing obstacles to RTO participation, and any plans to work toward RTO 
participation.”34  Participation in the RTO itself remained voluntary, but FERC noted 
that some utilities had “argue[d] that mandatory filings, coupled with threats of 
withholding benefits and/or leveling penalties for those that do not choose to 
‘voluntarily’ join an RTO, do not present a picture of a truly voluntary process.”35  
FERC stated, however, that while a utility’s decision to join an RTO is voluntary, 
“this does not mean that all aspects of this Rule are voluntary”36 and utilities were 
still required to file statements with FERC or face penalties.  Since Order 2000 was 
issued, the question of FERC’s ability to require participation in RTOs has been 
hotly contested, and the issue has often been discussed in the larger context of 
FERC’s jurisdiction over transmission in general. 
II.  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The lack of clarity separating state and federal jurisdiction over transmission has 
created a number of questions regarding the extent of FERC’s power.  Some utilities 
have launched  court challenges to restrict  FERC’s ability  to encroach on areas that 
                                                                
31Will McNamara, Utilities, FERC At Odds Over RTO Plans, SCIENTECH ISSUE ALERT, 
May 4, 2001, available at http://www.consultrci.com/issuealert/article.asp?id=709 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2001). 
3289 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285; 1999 FERC LEXIS 2692, *114 (1999). 
33Id.  
34Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 
31,390 (June 10, 1999); F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations ¶ 32,541 (1999). 
3589 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285; 1999 FERC LEXIS 2692, *140 (1999). 
36Id. at *150. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
78 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:71 
have traditionally been part of the states’ domain.37  These challenges have focused 
almost exclusively on statutory interpretation, rather than constitutional issues.  
Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the constitutional basis for regulation at the 
federal level. 
A.  The Constitutional Basis for Federal Regulation of Transmission 
There is little doubt that transmission of electricity could meet the Commerce 
Clause definition of interstate commerce; as the Supreme Court noted in United 
States v. Lopez,38 “Congress may regulate the ‘channels’ of interstate commerce, . . . 
the ‘instrumentalities’ of interstate commerce, . . . [and] those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”39  There is also little doubt that electricity 
transmission—even that within a single state—“substantially effects” interstate 
commerce.  After all, the Supreme Court has previously held that even wheat grown 
and consumed on a single farm substantially affects interstate commerce because that 
consumption of wheat decreased the demand for wheat in general.40  Likewise, 
electricity consumed by customers in Minnesota deceases the amount of electricity 
available to serve customers in Wisconsin.41 
Furthermore, the interconnected grid could even be seen as an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, for electricity travels through the grid to get from one state to 
another, just as goods in interstate commerce travel by railway from one state to 
another.  In Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois,42 the 
Supreme Court held that even railway service within a single state should be 
regulated as interstate commerce because “when . . . each one of the States shall 
attempt to establish its own rates of transportation, its own methods to prevent 
discrimination in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious influence upon the freedom of 
commerce among the States and upon the transit of goods through those States 
cannot be overestimated.”43  If one substitutes “transmission” for “transportation” 
and “electricity” for “goods,” this language could be applied directly to the debate 
surrounding jurisdiction over electricity transmission. 
In Wabash, the Court found that states were prohibited by the dormant commerce 
clause from regulating railroads.  In New York v. FERC and other cases challenging 
FERC’s jurisdiction, however, none of the parties has raised a constitutional 
challenge.  FERC has not argued that the dormant commerce clause prevents state 
regulation, and the states have not argued that intrastate transmission lacks a 
sufficient  relationship  to  interstate  commerce  to  allow for federal  regulation.  As 
                                                                
37See infra text accompanying notes 45-86. 
38514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
39Id. at 558-59. 
40Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). 
41See Northern States Power v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999). 
42118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
43Id. 
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noted above, it seems clear that the connection to interstate commerce is strong 
enough to permit Congressional action.  A dormant commerce clause challenge is 
also unlikely to succeed because as Congress stated in the statute “[n]othing in this 
subsection shall affect any authority of any State or local government under State 
law concerning the transmission of electric energy directly to an ultimate 
consumer.”44  Clearly, Congress intended to permit the states to continue to play a 
role in transmission regulation.  Subsequently, disagreements over the scope of state 
power have focused on statutory interpretation—i.e., how much power Congress 
intended to delegate—rather than constitutional powers. 
B.  Judicial Challenges to FERC’s Power 
Some utilities take the position that FERC has usurped too much power in its 
regulation of transmission and wholesale wheeling.  Others believe that the FERC 
has not gone far enough in asserting jurisdiction over bundled transmission. Several 
lawsuits have attempted to clarify the scope of FERC’s authority. 
In Northern States Power Co. v. FERC,45 a utility challenged FERC’s power to 
require curtailment of transmission to both retail and wholesale customers in the 
event of a power shortage.  The utility argued that it should be allowed to curb power 
to the wholesale customers first, since those customers would have the option of 
buying power elsewhere, and the utility should be allowed to continue supplying the 
needs of the retail customers who had no other options.46  FERC, on the other hand, 
maintained that such distinction between wholesale and retail customers constituted 
invalid discrimination in favor of the retail consumers.47  The court held in favor of 
the utility, finding that FERC “ha[d] transgressed its Constitutional authority which 
limits its jurisdiction to interstate transactions. . . . [I]ts attempt to regulate the 
curtailment of electrical transmission to native/retail consumers is unlawful.”48 
On remand, FERC narrowly tailored its order to permit Northern States Power to 
implement its curtailment plan only in the situation where “NSP has exhausted all of 
its network/native load generation redispatch options, and the firm point-to-point 
transmission customer whose firm service is being curtailed still has options with 
which to avoid having to shed load.”49  NSP later withdrew its tariff application, so 
the curtailment policy never went into effect.50  Nevertheless, the case raised 
questions about the scope of FERC’s authority: to what extent can FERC actions 
over wholesale transmission affect retail sales of electricity?  
                                                                
4416 U.S.C. § 824(k)(h). 
45176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999). 
46Id.  
47Id.  
48Id. at 1096. 
49Northern States Power Co., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,178; 1999 FERC LEXIS 2410 (1999). 
50Northern States Power Co., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299; 1999 FERC LEXIS 2657 (1999). 
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Authors Penniman and Turner have taken issue with the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
in Northern States Power, stating that FERC traditionally “has indirectly regulated 
the allocation of transmission embedded in wholesale and retail sales.”51  They cite 
FERC’s action in such areas as approving “wholesale contracts that specify the 
degree of reliability will be equal to that of native load,” “review[ing] transmission 
provider services,” and “approv[ing]service priorities that give transmission-only 
service a priority on par with native sales load.”52  Penniman and Turner therefore 
believe that the Eighth Circuit incorrectly determined that the indirect effect on 
native load was improper, and believe that the court should have found in favor of 
FERC. 
C.  Jurisdiction Over Bundled and Unbundled Transmission 
In Northern States Power, the central issue focused on FERC’s ability to 
indirectly affect retail transactions.  Recent court challenges of FERC’s power have 
focused on FERC’s ability to directly regulate certain transactions—most notably, 
FERC’s power to regulate unbundled retail transmission service.  With the 
promulgation of Order 888, FERC “concluded that it has jurisdiction not only over 
bundled and unbundled wholesale transmission services by public utilities in 
interstate commerce, but also over unbundled retail transmission services, by public 
utilities in interstate commerce.”53 
State challenges to federal jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission were 
litigated in Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC.54  In this case, several 
state utility commissions argued that FERC had no right to regulate unbundled retail 
transmission.  The plaintiffs argued that the Federal Power Act gave FERC the right 
to regulate only “transmissions of electricity consumed in a state other than that in 
which the electricity was generated.”55  Conversely, Enron Power Marketing argued 
that FERC should maintain jurisdiction not just over unbundled retail transmission, 
but over bundled electricity sales as well;56 FERC had not asserted jurisdiction over 
the transmission component of bundled sales, finding rather that “once the 
transmission service is bundled with generation and local distribution, it becomes 
merely a component of the retail sale itself, over which FERC has no jurisdiction.”57  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld FERC’s decisions against the 
challenges of both Enron Power Marketing and the states.58 With regard to the states’ 
                                                                
51William H. Penniman & Paul B. Turner, A Jurisdictional Clash Over Electricity 
Transmission: Northern States Power v. FERC, 20 ENERGY L.J. 205, 222 (1999). 
52Id. at 222-30.  
53People’s Electric Cooperative, F.E.R.C. Op. No. 426, 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,229 (1998). 
54225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
55Id. at 692. 
56Id.  
57Id. 
58Id. 
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challenge, the court found Florida Power & Light59 and Southern California Edison 
Co.60 to be dispositive.  Because the Supreme Court had ruled that the 
“commingling” of electricity from various states in the transmission grid could create 
a transaction in interstate commerce, the D.C. Circuit felt itself to be “bound by the 
High Court's dictates to conclude that the FPA gives FERC the authority to regulate 
the transmissions at issue here, whether retail or wholesale.”61  With regard to the 
challenge by Enron Power Marketing, the court was willing to defer to FERC’s 
position.  The court found that the statute was not clear regarding the demarcation of 
jurisdiction, and that FERC’s decision to cede jurisdictional authority over bundled 
sales to the state was a “statutorily permissible policy choice.”62 
D.  New York v. FERC: The Struggle to Define Interstate Transmission  
The D.C. Circuit’s decision has not ended the controversy regarding jurisdiction 
over unbundled and bundled power sales.  In February 2001, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and scheduled oral argument for October 2001 term to hear the 
case on appeal from the D.C. Circuit.63  Two basic questions are at issue in New York 
v. FERC:  first, did FERC have the right to assert jurisdiction over unbundled retail 
transmission? And second, if FERC did have the right to such jurisdiction, then did it 
have the right to refuse to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission? 
The biggest point of contention between FERC and New York is how 
“transmission in interstate commerce” should be defined.  New York and the states 
argue that FERC has no power to regulate unbundled retail sales because they are 
intrastate transmission and therefore outside of FERC’s realm. FERC argues that 
these transactions are part of interstate—not intrastate—transmission, which it has 
the power to regulate.  The main question, then, is whether such transmission is 
better characterized as “intrastate” or “interstate.” 
New York argues that the appropriate test to determine jurisdiction over retail 
transmission is whether energy is “transmitted from a State and consumed at any 
point outside thereof.”64  New York makes this argument based on its reading two 
sections of the Federal Power Act.  The original grant of jurisdiction to FERC in 
Section 201(b)(1) provides that “[t]he provisions of this Part shall apply to the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply to any other sale 
of electric energy”65 and Section 201(c) provides that “electric energy shall be held 
to be transmitted in interstate commerce if transmitted from a State and consumed at 
                                                                
59404 U.S. 453 (1972). 
60376 U.S. 205, 210 (1964). 
61Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 694 (2000), cert. 
granted sub nom New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001). 
62Id. at 694-95. 
63Id. 
64Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of the People of the State of New York and the Public 
Service Commission of the State of New York at 15, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 
(2001) (No. 00-568) (quoting 16 U.S.C. 824(c)). 
6516 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2001). 
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any point outside thereof.”66  New York argues that reading these sections together 
shows that “FERC cannot preempt state regulation of transmission from a generator 
to a retail customer in the same state.”67 
FERC, on the other hand, argues that the commingling theory adopted in Florida 
Power & Light demonstrates that “[w]ith transmission interconnection, some of the 
electricity generated and transmitted in one State is almost inevitably consumed 
‘outside thereof.’”68  In FERC’s interpretation, intrastate transmission applies only to 
states like “Alaska, Hawaii, and most areas of Texas” that “have no interconnection 
that would permit the physical transmission of power outside of a State.”69  New 
York believes that the commingling theory of Florida Power & Light should have 
“no application to FERC’s authority to regulate retail transmission” because the 
Court in that case was only determining whether FERC had the right to “look at [the 
utility’s] books” and FERC “was not trying to regulate an FP&L service.”70 
E.  New York v. FERC: The Controversy over Bundled Retail Transmission 
Enron Power Marketing, like the state of New York, also appealed the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision.  Enron Power Marketing took a position directly opposite of New 
York’s, though; it argued that not only does FERC have jurisdiction over unbundled 
retail transmission, but that it also has jurisdiction over the transmission portion of 
bundled sales.  Enron Power Marketing’s position is based on some of the same 
points argued by FERC; it relies on Florida Power & Light for the proposition that 
the interconnected nature of the grid makes virtually all transmission part of 
interstate commerce.71  Given this definition of transmission in interstate commerce, 
Enron Power Marketing sees no reason to distinguish between bundled and 
unbundled sales; the company noted that the grant of jurisdiction in FPA Section 
201(b)72 “contains no words limiting FERC’s jurisdiction over retail transmissions to 
unbundled  transmissions.”73  In  opposition, FERC noted that the Federal Power Act 
                                                                
6616 U.S.C. § 824(c). 
67Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of  the People of the State of New York and the Public 
Service Commission of the State of New York at 16, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 
(2001) (No. 00-568). 
68Brief for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission in Opposition to a Writ of 
Certiorari at 13 n.9, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568). 
69Id. 
70Reply Brief in Support of Petition for  Certiorari of  the People of the State of New York 
and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York at 2, New York v. FERC, 531 
U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568). 
71Brief Of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. at 29, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-809). 
7216 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
73Brief Of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. at 24, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-809). 
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gave states jurisdiction over “local distribution facilities and retail sales” and that the 
statute was not clear about where the line should be drawn.74  FERC also sought 
refuge in the D.C. Circuit’s finding that FERC’s “decision to treat bundled 
transmission as part of retail sales” was “‘a statutorily permitted policy choice.’”75 
Enron Power Marketing does not agree that the choice was “statutorily 
permitted.”  Enron Power Marketing noted that FERC had found evidence of 
discriminatory activity taking place even within bundled sales; the company quoted a 
FERC statement from Order 888: “We conclude that unduly discriminatory and 
anticompetitive practices exist today in the electric industry and, more importantly, 
that such practices will increase as competitive pressures continue to grow in the 
industry, unless the Commission acts now to prevent such practices.”76  Enron Power 
Marketing further noted that Congress had “command[ed FERC] to adopt a remedy 
for all discrimination that it finds” in Section 206 of the FPA, which states that 
“[w]henever [FERC] . . . shall find that any rate, charge, or classification . . . 
collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, 
[FERC] shall determine the just and reasonable rate . . . and shall fix the same by 
order.”77  Enron Power Marketing argued that “Section 206 is mandatory. Congress 
directed that FERC ‘shall’ determine and fix a remedy, not that it ‘may’ do so.  An 
agency is required to follow such directives.”78  FERC, however, simply responded 
that it “permissibly determined that an exercise of its jurisdiction was not necessary 
to achieve nondiscriminatory open access to transmission services.”79 
F.  How Should the Supreme Court Decide the Issue in New York v. FERC? 
The Supreme Court decision is likely to focus on statutory interpretation rather 
than policy considerations.  As California noted in its amicus brief in support of New 
York,  “[t]here are policy arguments . . . that control of the electricity transmission 
system should be shifted to the Federal Government.  The issue [in this case] is not 
policy.”80   The D.C. Circuit felt  constrained  by  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in 
                                                                
74Brief for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission in Opposition to a Writ of 
Certiorari at 20 n.9, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568). 
75Brief for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission in Opposition to a Writ of 
Certiorari at 21, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568) (quoting 
Transmission Access Policy Study Group, 225 F.3d at 694-95). 
76Brief Of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. at 36, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-809) (quoting Order No. 888 at 31,682). 
7716 U.S.C.§ 824e(a) (2001). 
78Brief Of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. at 35, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-809). 
79Brief for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission in Opposition to a Writ of 
Certiorari at 21, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568). 
80Brief of Amici Curiae the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the 
State of California in Support of Petitioners at 30, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-568). 
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Florida Power & Light, and therefore felt that it was obligated to find that unbundled 
transmission was part of interstate commerce under the Federal Power Act.  The 
Supreme Court, however, has an opportunity to limit Florida Power & Light to its 
facts and interpret the Federal Power Act in accordance with New York’s views.  
Even though I argue that more federal power over transmission is needed,81 New 
York appears to have a stronger case. 
Congressional intent in enacting the Federal Power Act appears to favor New 
York.  Certainly, Congress intended for the states to continue to play a significant 
role in utility regulation; in fact, many people argue that the FPA was only intended 
to fill the “Attleboro Gap” that came from the Supreme Court decision forbidding 
states from regulating interstate sales.82  Section 201(b) of the FPA supports this 
point of view:  “[t]he provisions of this Part shall apply to the transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce,” but that they “shall not apply to any other sale of electric 
energy or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised 
over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State 
line.”83  By explicitly maintaining state jurisdiction over some energy transmitted 
across state lines, the provision implies that Congress expected states to retain 
jurisdiction over transactions that did not cross state lines and further, that Congress 
expected that there would be a significant number of transactions that did not cross 
state lines. 
In fact, this expectation was borne out: for many decades, states continued to 
regulate in-state transmission as part of bundled sales.  Even after the Florida Power 
& Light decision, when Justice Douglas warned that “the Commission’s commingled 
tracing assumption will effectively eliminate electric utility regulation by States,”84 
the states continued to regulate these sales.  If Florida Power & Light were accepted 
for the proposition that all transmission is in fact in interstate commerce, then this 
regulation should not have happened. 
If, however, the Court finds that Florida Power & Light does stand for the 
proposition that all transmission is interstate commerce, then consistency would 
dictate that the Court grant Enron Power Marketing’s challenge, for the Federal 
Power Act is clear that “FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmission is 
exclusive”85 and, as Enron Power Marketing correctly notes, the FPA makes no 
distinction between bundled and unbundled sales.86 
                                                                
81See infra Parts III and IV. 
82Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of the People of the State of New York and the Public 
Service Commission of the State of New York at 3, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) 
(No. 00-568). 
8316 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
84Florida Power & Light, 404 U.S. at 475 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
85Brief for Respondent Electric Power Supply Association in Support of Petitioner Enron 
Power Marketing Power Marketing, Inc. at 3, New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 
00-568). 
86Id. 
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A better solution would be for the Supreme Court to limit Florida Power & Light 
to its facts.  It does not have to be entirely overruled; as New York noted, the case 
did not deal with regulation of the utility’s services, but merely declared that the 
utility fit the statutory definition of a “public utility.”87  Ruling in favor of New York 
would certainly not end the debate of the proper scope of federal power.  However, it 
would allow Congress to craft a solution that would be clear, unambiguous, and take 
into account many of the policy issues that California rightly noted were “not the 
issue” before the Court. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent to Florida Power & 
Light, “[t]he federal camel has a tendency to occupy permanently any state tent. That 
may be a wise course; but if so, Congress should make the decision.”88 
III.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Whatever the outcome in New York v. FERC, Congress still has the ability to re-
write the Federal Power Act to clarify its intent.89  Few people disagree that Congress 
could choose to grant a great deal of power to the FERC to regulate electricity 
transmission.  Even Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Florida Power & Light, wrote 
that while he disagreed with the “commingling” theory adopted by the court, he had 
“no doubt that Congress has constitutional power to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause the interstate  ‘commingling’ of electric power.”90 
Like Justice Douglas, most members of Congress appear to take for granted the 
ability to mandate a full scheme of federal regulation over transmission.  Indeed, 
most of the debate centers not on whether Congress has the ability to pass such 
legislation, but rather on whether enacting a stronger scope of federal jurisdiction 
would be beneficial to the country.91  In fact, at the same time that New York v. 
FERC was being appealed, most House members agreed on a provision in a bill that 
would codify FERC’s jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission; the bill 
faltered, however, when a more controversial provision was added that would have 
extended FERC’s jurisdiction to cover bundled retail sales.92 
In the past two Congressional sessions a variety of proposals have been put 
forward.  Each of these proposals would change the scope of federal regulation over 
transmission—some to a greater extent than others—but all would affect the general 
regulatory scheme.  In the 106th Congress, for example, there was a proposal to 
                                                                
87Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari of the People of the State of New York 
and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York at 2, New York v. FERC, 531 
U.S. 1189 (2001) (No. 00-568). 
88404 U.S. 453, 476 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
89See supra text accompanying notes 38-44. 
90404 U.S. 453, 469-70 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
91See Electricity Competition and Reliability Act of 1999:  Hearing on H.R. 2944 Before 
the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 
(1999), available at http://com-notes.house.gov/cchear/hearings106.nsf/20c324c6a1a1950a85 
25680f0067184a/5aa27673532e03ae85256992007b1644?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 25, 
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92Bliley-Barton Feud Rages, Putting Outlook For Compromise In Doubt, ELECTRIC UTIL. 
WK., July 10, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS file. 
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allow the federal government to exercise eminent domain to site transmission lines;93 
another proposal, developed in response to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Northern 
States Power, would have forbidden utilities from providing preferences to native 
load customers over wholesale customers.94  A second proposal would have required 
utilities to join RTOs.95  Additionally, as noted, there was also a proposal to “clarify” 
the FERC’s power to regulate unbundled retail transmission as well as a proposal to 
extend the FERC’s jurisdiction to cover bundled retail transmission.96  In 2001, in the 
107th Congress, there were proposals to “require[] federal agencies with rights-of-
way authority to report to the Department of Energy and Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission on ways to support new transmission lines or capacity expansions”97 
and “forthcoming” proposals to “to address interstate transmission and participation 
in transmission companies.”98 
Assuming that Congress does indeed have the power to regulate all transmission, 
what type of transmission bill should Congress pass?  This section examines various 
policy goals as they relate to transmission decisions.  It evaluates the sometimes-
competing considerations of efficiency, innovation, predictability, fairness, and the 
federalist system, and analyzes how these goals play out in the search for the ideal 
transmission policy. 
A.  Efficiency 
A concern for transmission efficiency includes a concern that electricity get to 
where it is needed most, as cheaply and as easily as possible.  Many people believe 
that the more transmission comes under FERC jurisdiction, the better able FERC will 
                                                                
93Victoria K. Green, Looming Power Outages Prompt Senate, House To Intensify Work on 
Electric Restructuring, THE OIL DAILY, May 23, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
ALLNEWS file. 
94See Electricity Competition and Reliability Act of 1999:  Hearing on H.R. 2944 Before 
the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 51 
(1999) (statement of Hon. James J. Hoecker, Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory 
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(1999) (statement of Hon. T.J. Glauthier, Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of 
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25680f0067184a/5aa27673532e03ae85256992007b1644?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 25, 
2001). 
96Bliley, Barton Have Dueling Proposals On Transmission As Bill Goes To Markup, 
POWER MARKETS WK., June 12, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS file. 
97This bill is S. 389 by Sen. Murkowski; see GOP Energy Bill Launches Washington 
Electricity Debate Anew, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., March 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, ALLNEWS file. 
98Murkowski Drops Energy Bill Seeking Tax Breaks To Boost Domestic Supply, POWER 
MARKETS WK., March 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS file. 
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be to implement a system-wide solution to the transmission problems.  To this end, a 
number of proposals have been put forward, each of which would extend FERC’s 
reach, and each of which attempts to pave the way for lower prices through increased 
competition. 
1.  Permitting FERC to maintain jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission 
As noted, the goal of Order 888 was to encourage wholesale competition by 
preventing transmission-owning entrenched utilities from charging higher prices for 
new generators to wheel power over their lines.99  The basic idea was that 
competitive generation could lead to lower prices for electricity; but in order to take 
advantage of competitive generation, electricity generators needed to be able to 
“wheel” their power.  FERC recognized that in order to have efficient wholesale 
competition, utilities would need to be able to wheel their power at a reasonable 
price.  Hence, including unbundled retail transmission within the scope of Order 888 
became a central part of FERC’s plan to open the transmission; the more that 
transmission transactions could be subject to FERC’s open access rules, the lower 
transmission prices would be.  
Many observers have agreed that federal jurisdiction is needed to ensure that 
power can be moved reliably and efficiently.  Recently, a representative from the 
Electric Power Supply Association testified before Congress, arguing that state 
jurisdiction over “bundled” uses of the transmission grid would result in the grid 
moving from “an eight lane super highway to a dirt road.”100  He cited a “poorly 
managed effort to curtail 400Mw of power flowing between Ontario and Michigan” 
in the summer of 1999 that led to “a dramatic price spike in Illinois, Indiana, and 
Ohio” to support his position that all transmission of electricity is essentially 
interstate commerce; and that federal regulation is needed to keep the grid 
functioning properly.101 
In addition to being less cost efficient, regulation at the state level seems likely to 
cause a “Tragedy of the Commons”102-style market failure.  All utilities with both 
generating and transmission facilities would benefit from being able to wheel their 
power at reasonable rates on others’ lines.  But the marginal utility of charging a 
higher rate to others may well exceed the marginal utility gained from unilaterally 
lowering transmission rates. Since states are likely to have only a small number of 
utilities inside their borders—and a much larger number of utilities outside their 
borders, wishing to stay within state lines—there is always an incentive to charge 
more than the efficient market would bear. 
Even some state regulators support Order 888; some agree that it could well lead 
to greater efficiency which would ultimately benefit their citizens.  John Hanger, a 
state regulator from Pennsylvania, expressed his support for Order 888 and the effect 
                                                                
99Lanka, supra note 26. 
100Hearing on Pending Electricity Legislation, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement Joseph 
Ronan, Vice President, Calpine Corporation and on behalf of Electricity Power Supply 
Association), available at http://energy.senate.gov/hearings/full_committee/Electricity_Legis 
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it would have on opening the nation to competition.  He wrote that “[t]he supply, 
movement, and price of electricity remains vital to the economies of Pennsylvania 
and the nation. . . . In my opinion, the price of electricity affects our nation's 
economic well-being more than the price of oil.”103  Hanger wrote that Order 888 
was an example of “cooperative federalism” that could aid the supply, movement, 
and price of electricity, and he cautioned that states should not “act like 
protectionists intent on impeding interstate commerce.”104 
Many state regulators disagree with Hanger and oppose Order 888.  Interestingly, 
most arguments by the states focus very little on the efficiency of federal regulation 
over unbundled retail transmission; rather, such arguments focus instead on the 
historical tradition of state power over retail sales.105  Nevertheless, there is some 
concern that federal jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission could make states 
more “hesitant” to enact retail competition, due to concern that “their commissions 
will be precluded from regulating much (or any) of the retail delivery service 
provided by the utility.”106  If this were to happen, then the promise of lower rates 
and greater competition could not be fulfilled.  However, there is no evidence to 
show that states are less likely to enact retail restructuring simply because of federal 
power over unbundled retail transmission; FERC noted that many states have 
ordered retail unbundling even after Order No. 888.107  In fact, states may be just as 
likely to forego restructuring for fear of a lack of access to reasonably priced 
transmission.  As FERC Commissioner William L. Massey stated, “[i]f the states 
cannot depend on the wholesale market regulator to ensure reasonable prices for 
consumers, then states will surely think twice before heading down the restructuring 
path.”108 
2.  Extending FERC’s authority to cover bundled retail transmission 
The arguments for extending FERC’s authority to cover bundled transmission 
sales are very similar to those for permitting FERC to regulate unbundled retail 
transmission—in a nutshell, such regulation is seen as a further step toward ending 
open-access  discrimination.   Among  those  people  who  agree  that  FERC  should 
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Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 76 (1999) 
(statement William L. Massey), available at http://com-notes.house.gov/cchear/hearings 
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regulate unbundled retail transmission, the main point of contention is whether it is 
truly necessary for the FERC to regulate bundled retail transmission.  Enron Power 
Marketing and many investor-owned utilities believe that it is indeed necessary; they 
point to FERC’s findings “that vertically integrated utilities regularly discriminate by 
providing themselves and their affiliates transmission superior to the transmission 
they provide to competing power suppliers.”109  As noted, such discrimination can 
lead to higher price charging and less competition in the marketplace.   
Interestingly, even though FERC made the finding of undue discrimination, the 
agency has been relatively silent on the question of whether federal regulation of 
bundled transmission would add to improved access and more competition.  In its 
brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, FERC simply stated that the agency 
had “permissibly determined that an exercise of its jurisdiction was not necessary to 
achieve nondiscriminatory open access to transmission service”110 even while 
acknowledging the “possibility that the quality of transmission service for retail 
purposes will be superior to the quality of transmission service offered for wholesale 
purposes.”111  
This position appears on one level to be contradictory: if retail-wholesale 
discrimination will exist without federal regulation, then isn’t federal jurisdiction 
necessary to encourage competition?  However, FERC may be correct in saying that 
such power may have little actual effect on open access: after all, under the current 
scheme, FERC has jurisdiction over the transmission portions of those utilities who 
have unbundled their transmission assets and desire (or are located in states that 
desire) to enter into the competitive arena.112  If these utilities or these states believe 
that there is little economic benefit to be gained from competition, they may choose 
not to unbundle; in that case, it would not be FERC’s lack of jurisdiction that is the 
primary impediment to competition, but rather a policy choice on the part of the state 
to not engage in such competition. 
3.  Increasing the number of utilities subject to FERC’s jurisdiction 
Proponents of increasing open access also want to expand the number of utilities 
under FERC’s jurisdiction.  Currently, only 20% of the nation’s transmission “offers 
some dimension of open access transmission service.”113  Much of the exclusion 
comes from “municipal systems, rural cooperative utilities, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority,  the Bonneville Power Administration,  and power marketing administra- 
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tions,” which do not fall under FERC’s jurisdiction.114  Recently, a bill was proposed 
in Congress that would end these exclusions and place “all transmission-owning 
utilities” under FERC authority.115 
Many people believe that such jurisdiction is crucial to promoting open access, 
since such utilities control a large part of the grid.  One author wrote that “[t]he 
FERC’s ability to promote competitive electric power through non-discriminatory 
open access is compromised if such entities are not subject to the same laws and 
regulations governing transmission access and ratemaking.”116  Few people disagree 
that such jurisdiction would help open access, though the American Public Power 
Association did note that no finding has yet been made that such utilities have 
“engaged in undue discrimination in the provision of transmission service.”117  If a 
finding of undue discrimination were to result from an examination of such utilities, 
however, it seems that adding them to FERC’s jurisdiction would be important to 
maintain open access. 
4.  Regional Transmission Organizations 
Most people agree that Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) can provide 
increased access to power.118  In states such as California that are subject to power 
shortages, RTOs are viewed as beneficial because they can “spread[] any blackouts 
across a wider region.”119  RTOs can also make transmission pricing more efficient 
by eliminating “horizontal transmission rate pancaking.”120  RTOs are perceived as 
being better able to manage transmission than Independent Systems Operators 
(ISOs) for two reasons.  First, RTOs tend to cover a larger geographical area; second, 
and related to the fact that they do cover a larger geographical area, RTOs are 
perceived as being less beholden to politics.  ISOs, by contrast, have been alleged to 
be  “political behemoths staffed by  former utility  personnel  and executives that are 
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strictly engaged in the short-term management of power markets and pricing to form 
a protected rate-of-return regime.”121 
Some states have passed restructuring plans that include a requirement for 
utilities to participate in an RTO. 122  In addition, FERC has asked utilities to 
voluntarily enter RTOs.123  Congress is considering a federal requirement that 
mandates participation in RTOs. William Hogan, for example, notes mandatory 
RTOS may be necessary: “The incentive-based carrots may not be enough . . . Some 
regions will do the right thing on their own, but not all.”124  He believes that it is just 
a matter of time before RTOs become mandated nationwide, asking “[h]ow long 
before FERC makes this mandatory?”125 
Opposition to mandatory RTOs is present, but not terribly strong.  House 
Resolution 2944 would have required utilities to join RTOs, and this provision 
garnered some response.126  The American Public Power Association wrote an issue 
brief stating that public power entities should be compelled to put their transmission 
facilities under an RTO only upon a specific “finding that the local utility has 
engaged in undue discrimination in the provision of transmission service.”127  Glen 
English, a representative from the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
stated his support for RTOs in general but warned Congress that “the only thing 
worse than no RTO is a bad RTO . . . An RTO put together too fast, without full 
agreement of all industry participants and without adequate review from FERC, is a 
prescription for problems.”128  A bad RTO, he stated “can make it easier for 
transmission owners to exercise market power, to favor their own generation, to 
restrict the flow of power across the RTO, or to raise transmission prices 
unreasonably.”129   A good RTO,  on the other hand,  would have the opposite effect. 
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Generally, however, people testifying on the bill agreed that well-planned mandatory 
RTOs would have a beneficial effect on the industry. 
5.  Transmission Siting 
The current dearth of new transmission had led some Congressional 
representatives to believe that the federal government should take control over 
transmission siting.  Last year, a bill was proposed that would give the federal 
government the power of eminent domain to site new transmission facilities.130  
Others agree that federal power over siting could expand available transmission 
capacity; an article in Public Utilities Fortnightly points out that such power has 
aided the expansion of transmission in the context of natural gas, and argues that 
“parallel authority” is needed for electricity transmission.131 
State regulators, however, have the advantage of being more in touch with local 
needs; while the need for transmission is no longer solely of local concern, local 
issues still have a large role to play in siting decisions.  A regulator from Ohio 
explained that “[r]ight now, the states adjudicate claims over transmission matters 
related to items such as the effect of electromagnetic fields and stray voltage on the 
milk production of dairy herds.”132  If FERC has sole authority over transmission, he 
wondered, “[d]o I now send the citizens groups and irate farmers with cows in tow 
down to North Capitol St. because only the FERC has jurisdiction over transmission 
service?”133  FERC is probably less equipped than the states to handle cows and irate 
farmers.  Unless the transmission shortage reaches critical levels, siting decisions are 
probably best left to the states.  Congress seems to agree; the bill introduced in 2001 
removed the eminent domain language from the 2000 bill.134  The sponsor of both 
years’ bills, Sen. Murkowski, stated that “if it becomes necessary, we can [regulate 
siting decisions],” but added he believed “[s]tates should have the right to address it. 
We think they will.”135 
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B.  Innovation 
One argument often heard for letting the states retain as much power as possible 
to regulate the electric industry is that the states will be free to innovate and 
experiment with different ways of fashioning the regulatory scheme.136 Justice 
Brandeis is occasionally quoted for his comments on “state laboratories”: “It is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state, may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”137 
This concern would seem to suggest that perhaps the country is better served by 
allowing the states free reign to develop their own regulatory policies; certainly, 
Texans have heard a great deal of talk about California’s “failed” attempt to 
deregulate the electricity industry, and how the Texas plan is different enough that 
Texas will not endure the problems faced in California.138  A policy that encourages 
states to innovate can be good for the nation as a whole; certainly, Texas leaders 
studied the legislation passed in California and Pennsylvania and tried to develop a 
system that took advantage of the best parts of other states’ plans.139 
The question should be raised, however, as to what degree of control over 
transmission is needed to gain the advantage of state innovation.  More precisely, if 
state PSCs continue to have jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission, will this 
jurisdiction help them formulate better deregulation plans? Certainly, the states seem 
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to think so: for the most part, they are loath to give up any of their current 
jurisdiction over transmission.140  
However, increased federal jurisdiction over transmission might actually give the 
states more flexibility to develop new regulatory schemes.  After all, states still have 
“authority to regulate the vast majority of generation costs, the siting of generation 
and transmission facilities, and decisions regarding retail service territories.”141  
Creative innovation in traditional rate regulation does exist, but most people talking 
about innovation in state regulation of electricity are generally talking about various 
plans to implement competition.  It is possible that greater federal regulation of 
transmission—to the extent that it could create genuine open access in 
transmission—could give the states the cushion they need to implement successful 
competition programs.  Such open access could conceivably take advantage of these 
state laboratories and encourage the states to find ways to take profitable advantage 
of “dispersed generation and momentary excesses of power by various utilities.”142  
C.  Predictability and Consistency 
A properly balanced policy also seeks predictability and consistency.  
Predictability is important from many angles: consumers want to be able to estimate 
how much their bills will be; utilities want to be able to propose a tariff that will be 
acceptable to regulators; everyone wants to be able to rely on transmission capacity 
being available when needed.  Currently, there is jurisdictional uncertainty over 
regulatory power over transmission.  This uncertainty has had a spillover effect: two 
market responses, refunctionalization and municipalization, can offer a way to 
“game” the system and take advantage of the uncertainty in the system.  These 
responses, in turn, can increase the lack of predictability in the market as a whole. 
1.  Refunctionalization 
Refunctionalization involves reclassifying transmission assets as distribution 
assets.  Refunctionalization is a direct response to FERC’s Order 888; in that order, 
utilities were invited to re-assess their transmission and distribution lines in light of 
the seven-factor test.143  By reclassifying lines as distribution, rather than 
transmission, a utility is able to add to its rate base and avoid including the newly 
designated  distribution  lines  in  their open  access  tariffs.144  Some utilities have re- 
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classified a large part of their transmission assets; in September of 1999, for 
example, Commonwealth Edison reclassified more than forty percent of its 
transmission lines in Illinois to a distribution function.145  Illinois Power 
refunctionalized and added $89 million to its distribution rate base;146 the 
refunctionalization was done with the support of Illinois state officials, who found 
the reclassification “reasonable” and therefore approved it.147 
Refunctionalization decreases the amount of certainty in the open-access system; 
in the words of one author, it makes the line between state and federal jurisdiction “a 
little less bright.”148  The fear with refunctionalization is that it if “transmission 
owners are allowed to appeal to local interests and authorities for these 
determinations, a consistent set of rules will be impossible and erosion of the 
interstate transmission system could result.”149  Transmission owners have an 
economic incentive to refunctionalize; even though the functional unbundling 
requirement of Order 888 stipulates that a utility must charge itself the same 
transmission price it charged others.  Such pricing requirements “don’t affect the 
owners of enterprises that ‘pay’ those dollars out of one pocket, but collect them in 
another, the same way they affect the owners of generation enterprises that do not 
collect, but instead pay, those dollars.”150  As a result, the only net economic effect 
for the utility is that it “benefits them by repelling competition from other 
generators.”151 
So far, FERC has approved all the refunctionalizations that have been filed.152  
Nevertheless, FERC officials have indicated that if they see a negative impact on 
open access, they will give no deference to the utility’s determination of transmission 
and distribution assets; one FERC Commissioner stated that “[i]f a proposed 
reclassification could impair the availability of open access services, the Commission 
would be concerned and would consider this possible adverse effect in evaluating the 
proposed reclassification.”153   FERC has also  indicated in another case that it would 
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follow “substance over form” in order to protect open access, by maintaining 
jurisdiction over a distribution facility that “is used to provide transmission service” 
by delivering electricity to wholesale purchasers.154 
FERC’s policy of following substance over form has been criticized as being 
“unsatisfactory to those seeking greater clarity.”155  The process of “drawing precise 
lines between transmission and local distribution facilities”156 is seen as “fact specific 
and . . . contentious, particularly when one is dealing with radial lines or lines of 
intermediate voltages.”157  Consequently, some commentators have called for a 
bright-line test based simply on voltage.  Richard Pierce, for example, had stated that 
such a test ought to “confer[] on the FERC plenary power over the rates and 
conditions of service for all transactions that use a high voltage transmission lines,” 
as “[t]he transmission grid would not function effectively if it were subject to 
potentially conflicting rates and conditions of service imposed by the FERC and the 
PUCs.”158 
Others agree that such a voltage test would provide important consistency and 
predictability to the transmission system.  Recognizing the need to balance accuracy 
with consistency, a representative of the Edison Electric Institute proposed a 
“rebuttable presumption” that would “allow a transmitting utility to petition for the 
exclusion of specific facilities or classes of facilities from transmission.”159  Such a 
rebuttable presumption could provide “greater assurance that utilities will not be able 
to create barriers to competition,”160 while at the same time providing a mechanism 
for utilities to appeal in the event that distribution was truly provided through high-
voltage wires. 
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2.  Municipalization 
Municipalization efforts center on a city’s ability to own and operate a utility; it 
has been described as “a century old phenomenon by which retail customers of a 
utility company are served by a newly formed municipal utility.”161  By owning a 
distribution system, cities become eligible to purchase power at wholesale for resale 
to city residents.  The city itself becomes a wholesale customer of the utility.162  
Wholesale competition—and lower wholesale rates—made municipalization a 
popular policy in the mid-nineties,163 and sparked a resurgence of interest after the 
perceived “failure” of California’s deregulation.164  Dozens of cities in a number of 
states have attempted to create municipal utilities to take advantage of wholesale 
competition since 1992.165  
Municipalization, like refunctionalization, is an issue fraught with gray areas.  
First, there is the difficulty in determining just what constitutes a city utility. In Palm 
Springs, California, for example, the city simply placed meters on some homes and 
businesses and attempted to call that a utility.166  FERC struck down the measure as a 
“sham transaction” but gave little guidance on what type of infrastructure a city 
needs to create in order to have a true municipalization.167  
Municipalization creates uncertainty for utilities as well as for cities.  Most 
utilities are highly resistant to the idea of being taken over by a government entity, 
and observers have noted that “[i]t appears to be routine practice for private utilities 
to intensely fight against any takeover efforts.”168  Utilities are encouraged to fight, in 
part, for fear  of  municipalization sweeping  the  nation  and  ending  their  ability  to 
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maintain profitability.  Author Richard Pierce finds it likely that a successful 
municipalization will lead to such a sweep: “Eventually, a utility will lose one of the 
many municipalization battles in some state.  Once that happens . . . the deintegration 
through municipalization movement will develop momentum so great that utilities 
will be unable to defeat it in any state or city.”169 
As long as cities can hope to achieve lower rates through municipalization, these 
issues are likely to remain.  However, FERC appears to be doing an admirable job to 
keep municipalization-related uncertainties to a minimum.  Through its decision in 
the Palm Springs case and similar cases, FERC has showed that it is unwilling to 
permit cities to engage in sham transactions to gain access to rate competition.  
Further, in Order 888, FERC agreed to permit utilities to recover their stranded costs 
after municipalization; permitting stranded cost recovery avoids allowing the 
municipalization to be a “mere tool by which customers will escape their cost 
responsibilities,”170 since cities would be paying for the utility’s investments 
regardless of whether they chose to municipalize the utility. 
D.  Fairness 
Discussions of transmission preference for native load customers usually center 
around fairness.  In Northern States Power, the utility argued that fairness dictated 
allowing a preference for native load customers who had “no other alternatives 
available to obtain electrical service.”171  Those opposed to the preferential 
curtailment policy saw things differently; in their opinion, it was “preferential 
treatment of native load customers” that  “violates the fairness precept.”172  They 
point out that the contract at issue in Northern States Power actually dealt with 
“power that was moving to the next state, Wisconsin, to serve their native load.”173  
Certainly, it is reasonable to protect customers who are not able to choose their 
electric service provider—customers for whom the utility is truly the provider of last 
resort.  Nevertheless, there is a great deal of truth to the maxim that “[e]veryone is 
somebody’s native load customer.”174  Many utilities purchasing power on wholesale 
contracts also serve captive customers—in such a situation, it is hard to say which 
customers are truly “deserving” of preference. 
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In the absence of a clearly “fairer” policy, it makes sense to look at the other 
effects of native load preferences.  California has argued that a native-load 
preference is consistent with consumer protection in general, stating that  “[i]n times 
when transmission is short . . . States commonly require electric utilities to protect 
first the retail customers to whom public utility obligations are owed.”175  This very 
protection of retail customers, however, can turn into protectionism of state 
customers at the expense of customers in other states.  A recent report on 
transmission policy found that this type of protectionism was in fact taking place, 
and was having a negative impact on open access in general.176  According to this 
report, the only solution to such protectionism lies in “requiring that all transmission 
transactions use the OASIS structure—removal of the native load exclusion.  This 
will bring far greater accuracy to the setting of [available transmission capacity] 
. . . .”
177
  Hence, the goal of fairness may be better served by eliminating the native 
load exclusion and treating all customers equally. 
E.  Federalism 
Finally, in addition to other policy goals, Congress may wish to ensure that states 
continue to play a vital role in regulating transmission.  The Supreme Court has 
noted that “Congress is acutely aware of the existence and vitality of these state 
governments.  It sometimes is moved to respect state rights and local institutions 
even when some degree of efficiency of a federal plan is thereby sacrificed.” 178  
States may be afraid of losing power even if they have never really used that 
power, however, especially in the context of jurisdiction over transmission; author 
Bruce W. Radford pointed out that within the last twenty years, no state has engaged 
in a rate case to determine the prudence of investment in transmission.179  In his 
view, the state position is without merit:  state PUCs are “suddenly filled with desire 
to recapture the power they never used.”180  States may be taking a somewhat 
inconsistent position in desiring to keep power that is rarely exercised.  Nonetheless, 
any bill that Congress passes would need the support of the states to be effective.  As 
the Supreme Court noted, “Congress may think it expedient to avoid clashes between 
state and federal officials in administering an act . . . .”181  Such expediency means 
that  Congress  must  write  legislation  to strike  a balance between regulatory power 
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that maximizes efficiency, while still presenting a regulatory solution that is 
acceptable to the states.   
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Congress’s challenge is to craft legislation that both facilitates the policy goals 
outlined above and is politically acceptable enough to secure the cooperation of 
FERC and the states.  This proposition sounds idealistic, but in recent years a 
number of bills have been proposed in Congress that may be able to strike just this 
balance.  Some of the best proposals are the following: 
(1)  Give permission for the states to enter into interstate compacts for siting 
decisions.  H.R. 2944, introduced in 1999, would have permitted such compacts. The 
bill provided that “[t]he consent of Congress is given for compacts among two or 
more States to establish regional transmission siting agencies to . . . facilitate 
coordination among the States within a particular region with regard to the siting of 
future transmission facilities.”182 
This proposal would combine the efficiency of regional siting decisions with the 
desire to maintain traditional state power.  It would be in the states’ best interest to 
join such a compact, for the transmission shortage affects all states connected to the 
interstate grid.  Furthermore, transmission shortages are more likely to affect an 
entire region, and not just a single state—for example, a recent transmission 
disruption between Ontario and Michigan caused a price spike in Illinois, Indiana, 
and Ohio.183  There is still the question as to whether the regional siting agencies 
would be as equipped to handle local issues like the “irate farmer with cows in 
tow.”184  However, a regional agency is probably more in touch with local needs than 
a federal agency would be, and the “irate farmer” would yield less political influence 
at the regional level than he would at the state level.  Thus, the regional agency 
would likely be able to deal with such complaints without necessarily letting local 
politics overrule regional needs. 
(2)  Codify FERC’s jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission and also 
codify the states’ power over bundled retail transmission. From a pure efficiency 
standpoint, it would probably be preferable to allow FERC to have jurisdiction over 
both bundled and unbundled transmission transactions.185 In the interest of getting 
the legislation passed, however, this is probably a case where Congress ought to be 
“moved to respect state rights and local institutions even when some degree of 
efficiency of a federal plan is thereby sacrificed.”186  During the 106th Congress, 
Representative Barton had enough votes to pass a bill out of the House Committee 
                                                                
182See Electricity Competition and Reliability Act of 1999:  Hearing on H.R. 2944 Before 
the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 
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on Commerce that would have codified FERC’s jurisdiction over unbundled 
transmission.187  This bill also contained a provision to protect open access that 
“would provide FERC policing authority to step in if transmission users could prove 
that a state had been lax in preventing utilities from favoring their own generation in 
granting transmission access.”188  Unfortunately, the bill failed because another 
representative pushed a new version of the bill that would have given FERC full 
jurisdiction over bundled as well as unbundled transmission, but brought objection 
from legislators who did “not want to take away traditional state authority.”189 
The original bill should be revived; it should contain the open access provision 
allowing FERC to step in if necessary, but should also contain language codifying 
that states have primary jurisdiction over bundled sales.  The bill would have the 
advantage of ending the uncertainty that comes from the Supreme Court’s review of 
New York v. FERC, for the bill would render the Supreme Court’s decision 
immaterial.  Furthermore, if (as posited in Part II of this paper) the Supreme Court 
finds that all retail transmission falls under state regulation, then the bill would 
protect FERC’s open access requirements in a way that would be acceptable to most 
states—notably, at a meeting where the Barton bill was discussed, state regulators 
were said to be “fairly receptive to the idea.”190  Finally, the “safety” provision 
allowing FERC to step in if the states were shown to be too lax would also aid in 
promoting open access—states would be likely to enforce fairly strict open 
transmission programs in order to avoid having FERC take over regulation. 
(3)  Extend FERC’s authority to cover more transmission-owning utilities.  As 
discussed in Subpart III(A)(3), extending FERC jurisdiction to municipal utilities, 
rural cooperatives, federal utilities, and power marketing administrations would 
promote open access and competition.  Politically, this may be a hard proposition to 
pass—after all, the American Public Power Association is a fairly powerful lobbying 
force.  If it appears unable to pass, then perhaps a provision similar to that proposed 
for bundled transmission might be more acceptable; such a provision would state that 
FERC could assert authority over such utilities only upon a finding that the utilities 
had been engaging in undue discrimination.  Even if FERC never asserted authority 
over these utilities, the threat alone might be enough to encourage the utilities to 
provide transmission at fair and nondiscriminatory rates. 
(4)  Create mandatory Regional Transmission Organizations.  The idea of 
mandatory RTOs is actually less controversial than most of the other propositions.191  
The biggest issues with mandatory RTOs may well be in the planning.  Certainly, the 
proposed RTOs should be carefully crafted and all participants should agree on their 
parameters.  Such agreement may be secured most easily if the functions of the RTO 
are fairly limited.  An RTO would not need to make siting decisions or demand 
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facility expansion, for example, if states in the region had created an interstate 
compact to handle such decisions. 
An RTO would be best equipped to handle regional pricing decisions—ensuring 
that rate pancaking was avoided, for example, and facilitating nondiscriminatory 
transmission.  FERC would play a mostly supervisory role; ideally, as noted in an 
article on transmission policy, FERC would “monitor[] the performance of the self-
regulatory RTO much like the relationship among the SEC and the large securities 
exchanges.”192  The RTO could also enforce reliability standards and maintain the 
grid. 
(5)  Replace the current seven-factor test with a brightline voltage test.  FERC’s 
current seven-factor test to distinguish transmission from distribution is perhaps 
highly accurate, but it encourages uncertainty by allowing utilities to “game” the 
system by relabeling transmission assets as distribution.  FERC should not wait to 
see if there is an adverse impact on open access, but should proactively remove 
utilities’ incentive to engage in discrimination through asset relabeling.  The 
“rebuttable presumption” based on voltage discussed in Subpart III(C)(1) would 
provide greater certainty while still allowing utilities to challenge a determination 
that was felt to be inaccurate. 
(6)  Remove the native load exclusion.  Because of the decision in Northern 
States Power, eliminating the native load preference cannot be done by FERC.  
However, legislation was proposed in Congress that would remove the native load 
exclusion.193  This legislation is likely to provide a benefit through eliminating some 
discriminatory treatment that is currently occurring in the wholesale market.  While 
it is possible (though uncertain) that the bill could be detrimental to customers who 
are currently protected by the native load exclusion, such customers could be 
protected by adding general customer protections to the bill.  Such protections could, 
for example, require utilities to consider whether a curtailment could result in any 
customers being unable to purchase power.  Such a protection would be different 
from the current native load exclusion because the utility would have to analyze not 
just whether its own native load would be displaced, but whether any utility’s captive 
customers would be harmed.  So, in the case of Northern States Power, a Minnesota 
utility would have to weigh the needs of its own customers against the needs of the 
neighboring Wisconsin customers.  Such a solution is far from perfect—it seems 
likely that a utility would always want to weigh its own customers’ needs more 
heavily—but nevertheless, such a policy could offer some measure of increased 
consumer protection while decreasing the amount of transmission discrimination that 
currently exists under the native load exclusion. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Increased competition in the electricity industry in recent years has had the 
unfortunate effect of slowing transmission growth, just at the time that transmission 
transactions are growing rapidly.194  Competition has also emphasized the lack of 
clear dividing lines between state and federal jurisdiction over transmission, and the 
Supreme Court will soon be determining where that line ought to be drawn.195  Such 
a decision will likely focus more on statutory interpretation than on determining 
sound policy.  Regardless of what the Court may decide, therefore, this paper argues 
that Congress needs to craft a new transmission policy that encompasses policy 
concerns and enacts a course of action that will benefit electricity consumers around 
the country.  This paper further argues that the best policy would be one that extends 
federal power over transmission while still remaining sensitive to state interests.  
Such a policy would go a long way toward helping the industry move toward 
competition while maintaining reliable, low-cost electricity service. 
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